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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- No. 15353 
MICHAEL PAUL ADA11S, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment of 
guilty rendered on one count of manslaughter in the Third 
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have his conviction reversed 
or, in the alternative, to have this case remanded for a new 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Michael Paul Adams, was charged with 
one count of criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended, (1973), to wit: That on or about the 
21st day of June, 1976, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the said Michael Paul Adams, intending to cause the death of 
Charles Roger Goodman, did cause the death of Gerald R. 
Braithwaite under the following circumstances: 
A. That he intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of Gerald R. 
Braithwaite; or 
B. Intending to cause serious bodily 
injury to another, he committed 
an act clearly dangerous to human 
life that caused the death of 
Gerald R. Braithwaite; or 
C. Acting under the circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference 
to human life, he recklessly 
engaged in conduct which created 
a grave risk of death to another 
and thereby caused the death of 
Gerald R. Braithwaite. 
The above-entitled matter came before the court, 
sitting with a jury, on the 11th day of July, 1977, before 
the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge in the Third Judicial 
District, State of Utah. 
At the close of appellant's case, the prosecution 
announced a rebuttal witness. The prosecutor then introduced, 
through that witness, a self-incriminating statement made by 
the appellant to the rebuttal witness, an arresting officer. 
Defense counsel objected to the admissibility of the statement 
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on the grounds that it was unvoluntary and requested a full 
hearing in which the trial judge could determine the issue 
of voluntariness and admissibility as a matter of law out of 
the presence of the jury (Tr. 375). The trial judge refused 
to grant defense counsel's request for a hearing and allowed 
only limited voir dire and cross-examination of the arresting 
officer and refused defense counsel's motion to allow him to 
put on independent evidence and testimony (Tr. 404). 
During closing arguments the prosecutor made preju-
dicial references concerning the appellant's invocation of 
the privilege not to have his wife testify (Tr. 483). 
After a jury trial, the appellant was found guilty 
of manslaughter. 
Due to the complexity of this case, further facts 
will be submitted in the argument portion of this brief as 
necessary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT TO A FULL HEARING TO 
DETERMINE THE vournTARINESS AND 
ADMISSIBILITY OF SELF-INCRIMINATING 
STATEMENTS MADE TO THE ARRESTING 
OFFICER. 
During an in camera proceeding, after defense 
counsel had rested and prior to the prosecution's rebuttal, 
the prosecution attempted to introduce self-incriminating 
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statements made by the appellant concerning the commission of 
the crime charged. Defense counsel moved to have the trial 
judge conduct a hearing to determine, as a matter of law, the 
voluntariness and admissibility of the appellant's self-
incriminating statements (Tr. 375). The relevant dialogue is 
as follows: 
MR. HANSEN: What I would ask the 
Court's permission to do is have 
that proffer of proof in court out 
of the presence of the jury so that 
in an attempt to lay a foundation 
the error won't creep in before the 
objection can be made. 
I think we're entitled to have that 
proffer of proof in question and 
answer form. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know that 
you're entitled to a proffer of 
proof. 
MR. HANSEN: Well, I'm making the 
motion that we have it in chambers 
out of the presence of the jucy in 
question and answer form to see if 
he can lay the proper foundation. 
MR. HANSEN: We're in effect there-
fore getting everything in there in 
front of the jury that could be 
avoided for any possible error. If 
we had it here first I don't see 
any disadvantage to the State. But 
I can see a lot of potential damage 
to the defendant if we have this in 
front of a jury. 
I think it's a matter of law 
whether or not the Miranda warning 
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has been given and whether or 
not the answer should be given, 
and I think as a matter of law 
it should be decided out of the 
presence of the jury and not by 
the--having foundation and what-
not laid in their presence. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not disposed 
to do that, Mr. Hansen. If you've 
got some legal authority that 
would indicate that that's what 
I should do I would be very inter-
ested in hearing about it. (Tr. 
377.) (Emphasis added.) 
The dialogue continued at a later point as follows: 
THE COURT: Well, if you have no 
objection to it, Mr. Yocom, I 
would do it. But I'm not disposed 
to do it. (Emphasis added.) 
Defense counsel at Tr. 394 expressly reiterated its 
claim that the Court must have a hearing to determine the 
voluntariness of the statement out of the presence of the 
jury. 
After a lengthy discussion as to the character of 
appellant's statements, the Court responded: 
Now, I at this point am not prone 
to pursue the matter in separate 
hearing unless I am furnished with 
some law. (Tr. 396.) 
At that point the prosecuting attorney stated that 
he was willing to allow the defense counsel to cross-examine 
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the witness, stating: 
MR. YOCOM: Your Honor, the State 
might comment on what has just 
transpired. I would have no 
objection whatsoever if Officer 
Riet be brought in and subjected 
to whatever voir dire, cross-
examination or questioning that 
counsel desires at this time with 
regard to the voluntariness or 
sufficiency of Miranda or anything 
else. 
If there is some question in the 
Court's mind as to voluntariness 
or anything else, I'm inclined 
to submit Mr. Riet to that type 
of examination in chambers before 
we proceed. 
MR. HANSEN: But we want that plus 
other witnesses, including the 
defendant, as to whether or not 
it was voluntary, whether or not 
he understood--. (Emphasis added.) 
THE COURT: Well, the problem I'm 
faced with Mr. Hansen, is this: I 
would assume that in the normal 
course of events that if you had 
some contrary evidence that the 
Court would afford you an oppor-
tunity to present that evidence 
to the jury. (Emphasis added.) 
Now, I have no intentions of pre-
venting that. But then it gets to 
the question of what weight the 
jury may give concerning the 
matter. And I would assume that 
if you think that you're prejudiced 
in some way, that you would have 
an opportunity if you so desired 
to put evidence on in connection 
with it. 
MR. HANSEN: But our position, 
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your Honor, is that the volun-
tariness has to be decided as 
a matter of law first. (Empha-
sis added.) 
THE COURT: I understand what 
your position is. 
MR. HANSE11: That's why I want 
to take extensive--
THE COURT: Well--. 
MR. HANSEN: --examination out of 
the presence of the jury of all 
witnesses that are involved in it. 
(Tr. 398, 399.) 
The Court denied defense counsel's motion, stating: 
And the motion made this morning 
as to a hearing in connection 
with the voluntariness, f~rther 
hearing in connection with it is 
denied. (Tr. 404.) 
It is therefore clear that the trial court was 
under the misconception that the defense counsel was not 
entitled to have an independent hearing to determine the 
admissibility and voluntariness of appellant's self-incrimi-
nating statements. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that where 
there is a question as to the voluntariness and admissibility 
of self-incriminating statements, the defendant is entitled 
as a matter of law to a full hearing outside the presence of 
the jury to determine the voluntariness of said statements 
-7-
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This was articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943). In that case, the defendant 
was convicted of a second degree murder charge based on his 
alleged self-incriminating statements. The court announced 
its position that the defendant is entitled to a full hearing 
to determine admissibility where the defendant would be afforded 
the right to introduce evidence and independent testimony as 
follows: 
. . The court will therefore 
hear, all competent evidence 
offereO:-both by the state and 
by the accused, as to the volun-
tariness of the confession, and 
then determine independently of 
the jury the competency of the 
evidence--that is the voluntari-
ness of the confession--as a 
matter of law. This doesriOt 
mean merely a prima facie showing 
but must satisfy the mind of the 
court in the light of all the 
evidence given by both state and 
defense. Id. at 185. (Emphasis 
included and added.) 
The court further held that once the defendant has 
objected to the introduction of self-incriminating statements 
based on their inadmissibility and involuntariness, the court 
must hear all evidence by both sides, stating: 
We hold that the defendant, 
~s·a·matter of right, may give 
all evidence he has before the 
court, pertaining to ~he volun-
tariness of a confession before 
-8-
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the confession is received in 
evidence; and that the court 
must base its ruling on the 
competency of the confession 
as evidence upon all the testi-
mony on the question adduced 
by both state and the defendant. 
If on a consideration of all 
the evidence on the matter the 
court does not find the confes-
sion to be voluntary it should 
be excluded as incompetent. 
To hold otherwise does violence 
to the constitutional provision 
that an accused may not be 
compelled to give evidence 
against himself. Id. at 187. 
Furthermore, the court held that where a trial 
court refuses to hear defendant's evidence on the question of 
admissibility, voluntariness, and competency of a defendant's 
self-incriminating statements, the trial court commits 
reversible error, stating: 
.. By thus, in effect, refusing 
to hear the defendants' evidence 
on the question of whether the con-
fession was involuntary and so in-
competent, the court was in error. 
Id. at 184. 
The Court's holding was founded upon the constitutionally 
protected right against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, 
Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah, and Section 77-1-10, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
The Supreme Court of the United States, some 
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eleven years after the Crank case, adopted the requirement of 
a full independent hearing out of the presence of the jury to 
determine voluntariness in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 
12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964). In that case the 
appellant appealed his conviction of murder in New York where 
the question of voluntariness of a confession was submitted 
to a jury. The appellant had contended that his confession 
was involuntary. On certiorari, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded, stating, among other things, that 
the New York statute violated due process of law in that it 
did not afford a hearing out of the presence of a jury in 
which the judge would determine, as a matter of law, the volun-
tariness of self-incriminating statements. The Court stated: 
The defendant, objecting to the 
admission of a confession, is 
entitled to a fair hearing in 
which both the underlying factual 
issues in the voluntariness of 
his confession are actually and 
reliably determined. Id. at 380. 
The Supreme Court continued its analysis as follows: 
At the very least, Townsend v. 
Sain 372 U.S. 293, 9 L. Ed. 2d 
770, '33 S. Ct. 745, would require 
a full evidentiary hearing to 
determine the actual context in 
which Jackson's confession was 
given. Id. at 392. 
The Supreme Court further held in Jackson, supra, 
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that states must adopt procedures consistent with that 
opinion. The Court stated that: 
... These procedures must, 
therefore, be fully adequate 
to insure a reliable and clear-
cut determination of the volun-
tariness of the confession, 
including the resolution of 
disputed facts upon which the 
voluntariness issue may depend. 
Id. at 391. 
The requirement of the separate states adopting 
adequate procedures to resolve this type of issue was further 
articulated in Boles v. Stephenson, 379 U.S. 43, 9 L. Ed.2d 
109, 84 S. Ct. 174 (1964). In that case, the appellant 
appealed on the grounds that the Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals used erroneous standards for determining the volun-
tariness of an oral admission of guilt and that said admission 
was involuntary. The Court stated: 
As we held in Jackson, supra, 
where the state defendant has 
not been given an adequate 
hearing upon the voluntariness 
of his confession, he is entitled 
to a hearing in the state courts 
under appropriate procedures and 
standards designed to insure a 
full and adequate resolution of 
this issue. Id. at 45. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Turner v. 
United States, 387 F.2d 333 (1968) reiterated and clarified 
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Jackson in an opinion by Circuit Judge Griffin Bell, stating 
that: 
The voir dire in connection with 
admissibility vel non of oral 
admissions, once the issue was 
drawn, should have been conducted 
outside the presence of the jury. 
(Citations omitted.) It is also 
reversible error not to permit 
the defendant, in such circum-
stances, to testify on the admis-
sibility, voir dire, and prior 
to her case in chief, whether a 
confession or admission, oral or 
written, be involved. It is then 
that a defendant may need to 
testify in rebuttal to the prose-
cution, and, this too, should 
take place outside the presence 
of the jury. (Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 334. 
The procedures that the Utah Supreme Court has 
promulgated to determine the voluntariness of self-incriminat-
ing statements clearly meet the Jackson requirements if they 
are followed. 
In the present case, as in Jackson and Crank, there 
was a question raised as to the voluntariness of appellant's 
self-incriminating statements. The appellant's statement 
which was in question is as follows: 
Well, I had to shoot the man. I 
had no choice . . . There was five 
of them coming at me all at once 
I can handle one or two, 
but i can't handle five at once. 
-12-
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The factual basis for appellant's claim of involun-
tariness was based on the fact that just prior to the time 
defendant made the statement, he had been hit in the eye with 
an ashtray, completely lacerating his eye from the socket. 
It was argued that under such conditions, the appellant was 
under such pain as to render the appellant incapable of exer-
cising free will so as not to have the capacity to refrain 
from making said statement, thereby making the statement in-
voluntary and its introduction into evidence prejudicial and 
by virtue of the fact that appellant was incapable of under-
standing any Miranda warnings, if in fact they were given. 
(See People v. McPherson, 465 P.2d 17, 94 Cal. Rptr. 129 
(1970) .) 
It is clear that there was a sufficient evidentiary 
dispute to require a hearing in the instant case by the trial 
judge to determine the issue of admissibility and voluntari-
ness as a matter of law out of the presence of the jury. 
Therefore, the trial court's failure to grant the 
appellant a full hearing where he would be entitled to intro-
duce independent evidence and testimony to enable the judge 
to adequately determine, as a matter of law, out of the 
presence of the jury, the admissibility and competency of 
self-incriminating statements violated Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution as interpreted by 
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State v. Crank, supra, Jackson, supra, Boles, supra, Turner, 
supra, and Section 77-1-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953). By 
refusing the requested hearing, the court committed prejudicial 
and reversible error requiring this court to reverse the 
appellant's conviction or, in the alternative, to have his 
case remanded for a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
A FAIR TRIAL WAS VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
CONCERNING THEIR DUTY TO DETERMINE THE 
WEIGHT Al.'\ID CREDIBILITY TO BE GIVEN TO 
ARRESTING OFFICER'S TESTIMONY CONCERN-
ING THE APPELLANT'S SELF-INCRIMINATING 
STATEMENTS. 
The trial judge erred in failing to meet his affirma-
tive obligation to specifically instruct the jury that it is 
within their province to determine what weight and credibility 
they should give to the arresting officer's testimony concern-
ing the appellant's self-incriminating statements. 
It is well settled in Utah law that once the judge 
has held a full hearing, is satisfied by the evidence, and has 
determined as a matter of law that a self-incriminating state-
ment by the defendant is voluntary, competent, and admissible 
(discussed, supra), he must then give to the jury an instruc-
tion that it is their duty to determine what weight and credi-
bility to give such self-incriminating statement. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this point in 
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State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943) when Justice Wade, 
writing for the majority, stated: 
. . . We agree with the rule 
approved in those cases, that a 
confession is not admissible in 
evidence unless it was voluntarily 
made; that this question must be 
determined by the court from all 
of the evidence from both sides 
bearing thereon; that if the court 
is satisfied from the evidence 
that the confession was voluntary, 
then the court admits the confes-
sion in evidence to the jury, 
together with all of the evidence 
on the question of whether it was 
voluntary, and the circumstances 
surrounding its being made, and 
from such evidence the jury must 
determine the weight and credibility 
to be given it, but may not determine 
its competency as evidence, that 
beinE a question for the court. 
Id. at 196. 
The Crank decision was reiterated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Allen, 505 P.2d 302, 29 Utah 2d 88 
(1973). The court stated: 
. If the court thereafter 
determines from the evidence that 
the confession was voluntary, it 
admits the confession in evidence 
to the jury, together with all of 
the evidence on the question of 
whether it was voluntary including 
the surrounding circumstances at 
the time it was made. The jury 
must determine the weight and 
credibility to be given to such 
evidence, but the jury may not 
determine its competency as 
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evidence, which is strictly a ques-
tion for the court. Id. at 304. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held the above posi-
tion to be the requirement in Utah courts in the cases of 
State v. Mares, 192 P.2d 861 (Utah 1948) and State v. Warwick, 
11 Utah 2d 116, 355 P.2d 703 (1960). 
In the present case, the trial judge gave no evi-
dence or instructions to the jury as to the voluntariness of 
appellant's self-incriminating statements, nor did he give 
them the surrounding circumstances in which they were made. 
The trial judge merely gave a stock instruction on the jury's 
right to determine what credence to give the testimony of 
witnesses generally. Utah law requires a specific instruction 
that the jurors have the power to decide what weight and 
credibility they wish to give testimony concerning defendant's 
self-incriminating statements. 
In the case of State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 296 
P.2d 726 (1956), after the court quoted the language from 
Crank, supra, quoted above, laying down the position that 
after the judge determined admissibility, the jury determines 
weight and credibility, the court went on to say that the 
court had an affirmative obligation to instruct the jury on 
the above standard. The court stated: 
. . . the jury should be 
instructed to consider such 
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evidence for the purpose of 
determining what weight should 
be given to it. Id. at 732. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Therefore the trial court in the instant case com-
mitted prejudicial error on two grounds: 
1. The court failed to meet its 
affirmative obligation to give to 
the jury specific instructions on 
the jury's duty and power to 
determine what weight and credi-
bility to give the arresting 
officer's testimony concerning 
appellant's self-incriminating 
statements recorded in his written 
report, and 
2. The court erred in not giving to 
the jury any evidence or instruc-
tions concerning whether or not 
the statements were voluntary, 
nor any evidence as to the sur-
rounding circumstances in which 
the statements were made. 
The trial judge's action clearly is in violation of 
the requirements of Crank, Ashdown, Warwick, and Allen, all 
supra. 
POINT III 
THE PROSECUITON VIOLATED APPEil.ANT'S RIGHT 
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS WELL AS HIS OON-
STITITTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY :rn HIS 
OWN BEHALF, BY FAILING TO DISCLOSE TO 
DEffi~SE COUNSEL PRIOR TO TRIAL, THE SUB-
STAi.'lCE OF, AI'ID HIS rnTENTION TO USE , SELF -
IHCRIMINATING STATEMENTS HADE BY THE 
APPELLANT AND REOORDED BY A..RRESTJNG 
OFFICER. 
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The prosecution violated appellant's constitutionally 
protected right not to testify in his own behalf as embodied 
in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution; Section 
77-1-10, Utah Code Annotat~d; the Due Process Clause, Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution; and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution by failing to disclose 
to defense counsel that the prosecution had in its possession 
a written recording made by the arresting officer of a self-
incriminating statement of the defendant made during his arrest 
at the scene of the alleged crime. 
Defense counsel had informally requested from the 
prosecution all evidence that he intended to use at trial. 
Further, at the preliminary hearing there was no mention by 
the prosecution that he either had in his possession or in-
tended to use at trial the arresting officer's written record-
ing of appellant's self-incriminating statement. It was only 
after defendant had elected to take the stand to testify on 
his own behalf that the prosecution, on rebuttal, attempted 
to introduce the written recording of appellant's self-incrimi-
nating statements. It was only at this point that defense 
counsel was made aware of such statements. 
Defense counsel objected on the basis of surprise 
and requested a hearing to determine the competency of the 
evidence as more fully discussed in Point I. The statement 
was admitted over appellant's objection. 
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The prosecutor's failure to disclose the existence 
of the statements constituted prosecutorial misconduct, con-
stituted unfair surprise, and violated appellant's right not 
to testify in his own behalf. 
The American Bar Association Standards Relating to 
the Administration of Criminal Justice, Discovery and Pro-
cedure Before Trial, Part II. Disclosure to Accused§ 2.1, 
Prosecutor's Obligation requires the prosecution to disclose 
to defense counsel any written or recorded statement made by 
defendant in his possession. The appropriate portion of the 
standard reads as follows: 
2.1 Prosecutor's obligation 
(a) . the prosecuting attorney 
shall disclose to defense counsel 
the following material and information 
within his possession or control: 
(ii) any written or recorded 
statements and substance of 
any oral statements made by 
the accused . 
The prosecution clearly violated this standard by 
failing to disclose either the existence or substance of the 
written recording of defendant's oral statement, thereby 
committing prosecutorial misconduct. 
The United States Court of Appeals, District of 
Columbia Circuit placed a due process requirement on the prose-
cution's duty to disclose in the case of United States v. 
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Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (1972). The Circuit Judge, J. Skelly 
Wright, writing for the court, stated that requiring the gov-
ernment to disclose evidence to the defendant "would make the 
trial more of a 'quest for truth' than a 'sporting event.'" 
Id. at 644. 
The court announced its position concerning prose-
cutorial disclosure and the standards to be used when it stated: 
It is the law in this circuit that 
the due process requirement applies 
to all evidence which might have 
led the jury to entertain a reason-
able doubt about defendant's guilt, 
and that this test is to be applied 
generously to the accused when there 
is 'substantial room for doubt' as 
to what effect disclosure might have 
had. Id. at 648. 
Further, the court stated that the due process re-
quirement of disclosure by prosecution did not only apply to 
evidence that was favorable to the defendant, but to all such 
evidence that was "crucial to the question of appellant's 
guilt or innocence." Id. at 649. 
The court announced the purpose for this requirement 
when it stated: 
The purpose of the duty is not 
simply to correct an imbalance 
of advantage whereby the prosecu-
tion may surprise the defense at 
trial with new evidence, rather, 
it is also to make of the trial a 
search for truth informed by all 
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relevant material, much of 
which, because of imbalance in 
investigative resources, will 
be exclusively in the hands of 
the Government. Id. at 648. 
Therefore, in the instant case, the prosecution 
clearly breached this standard, thereby violating appellant's 
right to due process of law. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third District of 
California in the case of People v. Superior Court, in and 
for the County of Shasta, 70 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968), in deciding 
the question of pretrial discovery, stated: 
Prior to trial, a defendant is 
entitled to obtain written 
statements made by him to police 
officers ... Obviously, the 
same rule applies to oral state-
ments made to the police. Id. at 
483. (Citations omitted.) 
Therefore it is clear that in the present case the 
prosecution had a duty to disclose to the defense counsel that 
the prosecution had in its possession and intended to use self-
incriminating statements made by the defendant to the arresting 
officer, preserved in the officer's investigative report that 
was within the exclusive possession and control of the prose-
cution. The prosecution's failure to disclose such to defense 
counsel until after appellant had testified in his own behalf 
abridged appellant's right to elect not to testify and violated 
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the due process clause of the United States Constitution and 
the Constitution of Utah. 
POINT IV 
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENT TOGETHER WITH 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO ADMONISH 
THE JURY CONCERNING THE APPELLANT'S WIFE'S 
FAILURE TO TAKE THE STAND DENIED APPEllA'IT 
HIS STATUIORY Al.'ID CONSTITIITIONAL RIGHT NOT TO 
HAVE HIS WIFE TESTIFY. 
At the close of the trial, during the prosecution's 
closing arguments, the prosecution made prejudicial references 
to appellant's wife's failure to testify at trial. The preju-
dicial remark is as follows: 
He warned Carol over the phone. 
Could have--he said he talked to 
her. 'Well, she's coming over.' 
What did he tell her? He could 
tell her, 'Carol, don't come. 
I think Charlie's got a gun and by 
God he's going to come in here and 
kill you. You're crazy for coming.' 
Well, we don't know what he told her. 
I su ose we 11 never know what he 
said to his wi e. Emphasis added.) 
(Tr. 483.) 
This is clearly prosecutorial misconduct in violation 
of Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah, Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 77-1-10, and Rule 39 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 39, dealing with 
reference to exercise of privilege states: 
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If a privilege is exercised not to 
testify or to prevent another from 
testifying, either in the action 
or with respect to particular 
matters, or to refuse to disclose 
or to prevent another from disclos-
ing any matter, the judge and 
counsel may not conunent thereon, 
no inference shall arise with 
respect to the exercise of the 
privilege, and the trier of fact 
may not draw any adverse inference 
therefrom. In those jury cases 
wherein the right to exercise a 
privilege, as herein provided, may 
be misunderstood and unfavorable 
inferences drawn by the trier of 
fact, or be impaired in the particu-
lar case, the court, at the request 
of the party exercising the privi-
lege, may instruct the jury in 
support of such privilege. 
The prosecutor's misconduct, being in violation of 
the constitution, statutes, and Rules of Evidence of Utah is 
clearly error. However, it is possible for the trial judge 
to correct this error by a timely and adequate admonition to 
the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statements and in 
support of the privileges not to testify at trial. However, 
in the present case, the trial judge refused defendant's motion 
for mistrial and in no way admonished the jury to disregard 
prosecutor's statement. (Tr. 538.) 
The prosecutor's conunent and the judge's failure to 
admonish the jury constituted a substantial impairment and 
disparaged defendant's right to claim the privilege not to 
have his wife testify at trial. In the case of State v. 
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Brown, 14 Utah 2d 324, 383 P.2d 930 (1963), the defendant was 
convicted of a rape. His defense was alibi in that he was 
home with his wife at the time of the offense. The court held 
that it was prejudicial error for prosecuting attorney to 
comment to the jury on defendant's wife's failure to testify. 
The court reversed with directions to grant a new trial. The 
court stated: 
The district attorney's comment to 
the jury in substance, that the 
defendant's wife, the one person 
who could have testified that 
defendant was at home at the time 
the assault occurred did not 
testify, was prejudicial error. 
Id. at 932. 
The court was concerned in that letting prosecutors 
refer to the invocation of the privilege would in effect destroy 
or impair the privilege. The court stated: 
The cases are in hopeless confusion 
whether such comment on the 
failure to testify is prejudicial 
error. If such comment is permis-
sible, the privilege is largely 
destroyed. We conclude that this com-
IIEnt destroyed the privilege to not testify 
and was prejudicial. 
Id. at 932. 
The standard for determining whether or not a comment 
by the prosecutor is improper and therefore error was set out 
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in State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 113 (1972). In 
that case, defendant was found guilty of second degree murder 
and appealed on the grounds that the prosecutor made refer-
ences to the invocation of the privilege to have his wife not 
testify. The court set out the standard when it stated: 
That any conunent by the prosecutor 
which in a substantial way will 
impair or disparage a claim of 
privilege is improper and there-
fore is error; and that if it be 
such that there is a possibility 
that it prejudiced the defendant, 
in the sense that there is any 
likelihood that there may have 
been a different result, then 
the error should be deemed preju-
dicial and another trial granted. 
Although the court in the Trusty case affirmed the 
lower court's findings of no error, it did so on two grounds . 
. . First, there was no objec-
tion upon which the court could 
act until after the defendant had 
answered the question. The 
second, if there had been any 
implication adverse to the defen-
dant, the trial judge gave an 
appropriate cautionary instruc-
tion which it should be assumed 
that conscientious jurors would 
follow. Id. at 114, 115. 
In the present case, the harm was committed by the 
inference that the jurors could have drawn from the prosecu-
tion's remarks and, second, by the judge's failure to cure 
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any possible adverse implication by an appropriate cautionary 
instruction or admonition. The comment by the prosecutor, 
having gone unchecked and uncorrected by an appropriate cau-
tionary instruction or admonition by the trial judge, denied 
appellant his constitutionally and statutorily protected right 
to claim the privilege of having one's wife not testify at 
trial and therefore the error should be deemed prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant seeks reversal or, in the alternative, 
to have the case remanded for new trial based upon the follow-
ing grounds: 
A. The trial court's refusal to grant 
the appellant a full hearing where 
he could introduce independent 
evidence and testimony as well as 
cross-examine any witnesses intro-
duced by the prosecution for the 
purpose of determining the volun-
tariness and admissibility of self-
incriminating statements violated 
the appellant's constitutionally 
protected right against self-
incrimination and due process under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 12 of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
The admission into evidence of the 
incriminating statement made by the 
appellant without be~ef~t.of said. 
hearing was both prejudicial and in 
violation of appellant's constitu-
tional rights as interpreted by the 
courts under Crank, Boles, and 
Jackson. 
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B. The trial judge cormnitted preju-
dicial error by failing to spe-
cifically instruct the jury 
concerning their power and duty 
to determine what weight and 
credibility they wish to give 
to the arresting officer's 
test~nony as to appellant's 
self-incriminating statement as 
well ~s his failure to give to 
the jury all relevant evidence 
concerning the voluntariness of 
the statements and evidence as 
to the surrounding circumstances 
under which the statements were 
made, this being in conflict 
with the requirements for a fair 
trial set down by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Crank, Allen, 
Mares, Warwick, ASfidOWn, supra, 
and in violation of due process 
of law. 
C. The prosecution violated appel-
lant's right to <lue process of 
law as embodied in Article I, 
Section 7 of the Constitution of 
Utah and the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, 
as well as appellant's constitu-
tional right not to testify in 
his own behalf as embodied in 
Article I, Section 12 of the 
Constitution of Utah and Section 
77-1-10, Utah Code Annotated, by 
failing to disclose to defense 
counsel that the prosecution had 
in its possession a written re-
cording of appellant's self-
incriminating statements made to 
arresting officers introduced and 
disclosed during rebuttal after 
appellant had testified in his 
own behalf and had rested his 
case. 
D. Appellant's constitutional right 
not to have his wife testify at 
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trial as embodied in Article I, 
Section 12 of the Constitution of 
Utah; Section 77-1-10, Utah Code 
Annotated; and Rule 39 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence was substan-
tially impaired by the prosecution 
cormnenting to the jury concerning 
the failure of the appellant's 
wife to testify and by the trial 
judge's failure to correct the 
error through a timely admonition 
to the jury to disregard the 
prosecution's statement as re-
quired by Brown and Trusty, supra. 
Wherefore, appellant respectfully prays that the 
court reverse his conviction or, in the alternative, that this 
case be remanded for new trial. 
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